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Abstract Given the inherent complexity of the maritime transportation system,
developing effective policy can be challenging. Using risk factors identified by an
elicitation and aggregation of expert judgment, a relative-risk rating scheme was
developed in the theory-building tradition of the social sciences. The model was
empirically evaluated using 18 months of data from the US small passenger vessel
sector. The model identified that the top 10% of relatively highest risk vessels
accounted for 50% of all marine casualties during the period of examination. A
policy for deploying the model nationally is proposed.
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1 Introduction
Safety of life at sea is one of the most important functions for stakeholders within the
maritime domain. Whether ship owners and operators, ship designers and builders,
classification societies, or port state, and flag state regulators—all of these
stakeholders have an interest in safety. There currently exist a wide variety of
measures to ensure safety within the maritime domain. In efforts to further enhance
safety, stakeholders often turn to measuring risk (an inverse of safety) as a means of
identifying further opportunities for improvement to avoid rare event or even
common accidents. Without getting into the semantic differences about the
definitions of risk just yet, it should be noted that there are a wide variety of
approaches to conducting risk assessment within the maritime domain (for a review
of some, see Guedes Soares and Teixeira 2001). Covello and Merkhofer (1993)
describe risk analysis as consisting of three stages—hazard identification, risk
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assessment, and risk evaluation—which provide information for consideration in risk
management. There is a strong history of risk analysis within the maritime domain,
including the Formal Safety Assessment process (International Maritime Organiza-
tion 2002) which was introduced by the International Maritime Organization to
inform its standards development activities (see e.g., Ventikos and Psaraftis 2004;
Ellis et al. 2008; Vanem et al. 2008; Hu et al. 2007; Wang and Foinikis 2001). This
study has been focused on building a model suitable for empirical analysis and
hypothesis testing.
1.1 Causal chain framework
The use of a causal chain framework is prominent in the maritime domain (e.g.,
Antão and Guedes Soares 2008; Harrald et al. 1998; Baisuck and Wallace 1979) as
well as in many other domains (e.g., see Bick et al. 1979; Fischhoff et al. 1981 for an
example of causal chain use in highway transportation). Even though the use of a
causal chain framework is extremely instructive in understanding system risks, some
difficulties have been associated with that particular form of risk analysis. For
example, Wagenaar and Reason (1990) suggested a concern that focus should be
applied to matters of higher order than paths of accidental events, Wagner (1999)
observed that causality may not be appropriate for second-order or non-linear
interactions among variables, Rasmussen et al. (1990) noted certain procedural
difficulties for capturing human error, and Russell (1919) noted certain linguistic
obstacles involving the notion of causality. Despite these points for consideration,
there remains considerable historical support for using the causal chain approach
(see e.g., Wold 1965, 1954; Strotz and Wold 1960; Strotz 1960; Wold 1960 which
focus on econometric models). While all methodologies have pros and cons, as well
as supporters and detractors, it is not the intent of the study to suggest that any one
method is superior to another. Rather, this study is intended to illustrate a theory-
building frame as an alternative means of risk analysis.
1.2 Other frameworks for conducting risk analyses
The study of risk includes the examination of risk assessment, risk analysis, risk-
informed decision making, risk management, risk perception and tolerance, risk
communication, and all of the other interesting explorations which treat the concept
of risk as an ends or means in advancing our understanding of the world. Regardless
of how we define this area of inquiry, the modern study of risk is in its relative
infancy. Often, as disciplines or areas of inquiry develop and mature, and when new
phenomenon are discovered less frequently, it may become inevitable that
researchers will turn their attention to better understanding the known findings.
This sort of lifecycle could be viewed as typical; the field of social psychology is
one example where such development has occurred. Spencer et al. (2005) noted that,
during a similar inflection point in the development of the social psychology field,
researchers began to overemphasize one particular model and methodology based
upon the seminal work of Barron and Kenny (1986). While it is probably premature
to suggest that one model or methodology has emerged as dominant in the study of
risk, and it is definitely premature to consider the study of risk a well-formed
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discipline, the use of accident causal chains as a framework for risk study has
become widely accepted in the maritime domain (see e.g., Grabowski et al. 2007a, b;
van Dorp et al. 2001). While the use of accident causal chains in the maritime
domain appears to emanate from the other disciplines, Baisuck and Wallace (1979)
provided us a proposed causal chain framework as a means of developing public
maritime policy strategies without conducting time-consuming descriptive analyses.
Interestingly, while Spencer et al. (2005) call for establishing causal chain
analysis as a needed companion to the existing meditational analyses, this paper
puts forth a theoretical moderation-of-process model built in the tradition of the
social sciences (Dubin 1978) to complement the existing causal chain models
already existing within the maritime domain. To put this taxonomy of models in
context, Fig. 1 provides a description of recommended experimental designs
adapted from Spencer et al. (2005).
This taxonomy shows various combinations of relative ease of system
manipulation (in columns) and relative data availability (in rows) and suggests
various types of experimental design. Casual chain analyses are conceptually
intuitive and informative; the prevalence of causal chain analyses in the maritime
domain is explained, in part, by this figure. From a practical perspective, data for
analyses are typically unavailable, but once the analysis has been completed (often
using data from expert judgment), adjustments to the system are relatively easy to
make and results observed. Alternatively, in cases where data are available, and the
system is relatively easy to manipulate, the moderation-of-process design is
appropriate. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to developing an analytical
framework for a moderation design using the eight-step theory-building methodol-
ogy proposed by Dubin as described in Fig. 2. This theory-building process has been
deployed widely. Examples include scenario planning (Chermack 2005), entrepre-
neurship (Ardichvili et al. 2003), and software design (Sjoberg et al. 2008).
The purpose of this paper will be to put forth a theory-building process as a
means of assigning relative risk to vessels, and ultimately as a means of strategically
allocating resources for ship inspections and other safety risks to the highest risk
vessels along the lines proposed by Degré (2007) and others. The model developed
was empirically tested using data from the US commercial small passenger vessel
fleet. This fleet is made up of approximately 6,000 vessels and is considered to be a
sufficiently large, unique population to demonstrate the efficacy of the process and
model.
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Fig. 1 Recommended experimental designs based upon ease of measurement and ease of manipulation of
the system under study
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2 Analytic framework
In the social science tradition of theory building (Dubin 1978), this study developed a
model, or theory, to identify relevant risk factors in order to indicate high-risk states that
may necessitate additional action to reduce risk and thereby, improve or maintain safety.
Ideally, theory-building principles are universal and transcend disparate paradigms of
thought and research (Gioia and Pitre 1990), but Dubin's theory-building methodology
clearly falls within the functionalist paradigm (Holton and Lowe 2007) and, as such,
treats the nature of a phenomenon as basically objective, awaiting impartial exploration
and discovery. This paradigm supports a deductive approach to theory building that
specifies hypotheses to be tested in the world using statistical analyses. While the
functionalist approach to risk analysis is common in the maritime domain, Dubin's
theory-building process is not prevalent and presents as an opportunity for advancement.
There are many methods for risk assessment. Ayyub (2001) provides taxonomy of
nearly 100 methods organized by type as well as by release assessment, exposure
assessment, consequence assessment, and risk estimation. While the first three types
are similar to Merhhofer's (1986) risk chain, the risk estimation category provides
considerable potential utility for this study as it does not segment into particular
elements of the risk triplet (Kaplan 1997), but rather provides a means of capturing
all facets of risk. In particular, the risk estimation taxonomy contains relative risk
models—of which the model proposed in this paper, will be yet another.
Using an expert elicitation and aggregation process, risk factors were identified. Then,
the interactions between and among these unit concepts/constructs were established.
System boundaries and states were described. Finally, through another expert elicitation
process using a paired comparison method, empirical indicators were created for each of









Steps 1 to 5: Theory Building
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Risk factors serve as the building-block unit concepts/constructs for the development of
this risk analysis model. Ultimately, the selection of which risk factors to consider is
arbitrary and at the discretion of the researcher. The identification of risk factors, or units,
is often a reflection of the current “disciplinary” state. As Dubin (1978, p. 80) noted:
“It might even be suggested that the stage of development of a discipline is
revealed by the emphasis on the ways in which new units are advanced in the
field. If extension is the method primarily employed, then the discipline is
probably relatively new, and analytical attention is still directed at filling out
the collection of analytic units employed. If the discipline is well established,
then analytic attention may turn to filling in the analytic units employed, in
which case subdivision will be employed.”
Whereas many of the models being developed for considering risk present new
risk factors for consideration (see e.g., Trucco et al. 2008), this model does not
introduce new risk factors, but attempts to further refine or define some of the most
prominent ones. Considering the field of risk analysis, this refinement of existing
risk factors is somewhat out-of-step with the disciplinary trajectory previously
described. Thus, while the utility of this model will necessarily be restricted by the
choice and definition of its risk factors, the conceptual frame of theory building
presented will provide broad value in specifying a context for consideration,
discussion, and development of future models.
2.1.1 Using risk factors as a leading indicator of accidents
Recently, much work has been focused on developing leading indicators for the
maritime domain (e.g., Grabowski et al. 2007a, b). Direct leading indicators, those
that are observable and can be identified as a direct cause of an incident, can be used
directly in a causal chain format. However, direct leading indicators are extremely
difficult to ascertain. Therefore, indirect indicators (those proxies or surrogates that
are associated with an incident) are identified to predicate accidents. The key to
identifying the indirect indicators, also known as proxies, is to establish a strong
linkage between the risk factor and the resultant undesirable event. Risk factors can
be viewed as the leading indicators of risk. This concept of risk factors has a long
history of use in the medical fields (see two recent examples e.g., Reunes et al. 2011;
Grandjean et al. 2011). While we will ultimately be interested in exploring the
various relationships between the risk factors, we will first identify those risk factors
between specific correlates and accident outcomes.
2.1.2 Using an abstraction hierarchy to identify risk factors
Even though risk can be problematic as a leading indicator because probability is
conditional and exposure increases with time, and it presses the limits of human cognition
(e.g., Kahneman et al. 1982), there may be methods for identifying risk factors through
other than temporal relationships or direct estimation that may yield more favorable
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results. Dubin provides a method for identifying new units through inventing and
introducing intervening variables into the model. For example, using the risk lexicon
proposed by the National Research Council (2008), risk is defined as the potential for
unwanted, adverse consequences. This notion of risk clearly has a probability
component and a consequence component that are combined through some
mathematical operation to quantify the risk. In the typical causal chain framework,
leading indicators are typically identified temporarily by disaggregating the causal
chain into its component parts, each preceding the other like antecedent links in a chain.
However, from the example of the definition of risk, this temporal decomposition is not
possible. What is the intermediate condition between probability or consequence and
risk? To avoid this situation, rather than horizontal temporal (or even special)
decomposition, vertical abstraction decomposition is considered. Rasmussen (1986)
introduced the notion of the abstraction hierarchy such that means–ends, parts–whole
abstractions across five levels (i.e., functional purpose, abstract function, generalized
functions, physical functions, and physical forms) are employed to provide system
representations and clear procedures that improve safety. In this context, risk as a
function of probability and consequence is an abstraction at the other end of the
abstraction hierarchy from more readily identifiable physical forms and functions that
are less cognitively complex and more likely to be interpreted consistently. Therefore,
risk factors are developed by pushing down the abstraction hierarchy from the risk
abstraction to more tangible objects that indicate risk or some component of risk.
2.1.3 Expert elicitation of risk factors
In this study, the focus was on developing a means of assessing the risks of small
passenger vessels. For the purposes of this study, small passenger vessels are defined
as vessels that carry more than six passengers (including at least one for hire) and
less than 100 gross tons (U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 2008). The study was
limited to small passenger vessels because it was deemed that this vessel population
was sufficiently similar in nature to provide a meaningful comparison. Including
additional vessel types such as tankers, barges, cargo ships, or even large passenger
vessels would likely have produced less meaningful results because the population
would not have been homogeneous.
A homogenous group of five experts was assembled with over 60 years of
collective experience in port state and flag state regulatory development and
implementation. The experts were trained in the elicitation process and were
instructed to develop a list of their top ten attributes for judging the risk of small
passenger vessels. Using the nominal group technique (van de Ven and Delbecq
1971), the experts came up with a list of 28 unique risk factors (see Appendix).
These risk factors ranged from operating route (the only one which all of the experts
suggested) to vessel age (that the majority of experts recommended) to market
competition (one of several risk factors that only one expert suggested). In
retrospect, it might have been advantageous to have assembled a diverse
heterogeneous group of problem solvers in that the portfolio of solutions would
have been more diverse and likely containing an even better solution than the expert
group (Hong and Page 2004; Page 2007). Nonetheless, the results were sufficient to
continue in the development of this model.
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Next, the experts participated in a Delphi technique (Linstone and Turoff 1975) to
establish a list of the most informative risk factors. A consensus about the top risk
factors was achieved after three Delphi rounds of expert input, consolidation, and
clustering (see Table 1).
To provide a level of abstraction similar to the other risk factors, crew
competency, operator experience and quality, casualty (accident) history, and
discrepancy (regulatory violation) history were merged into a single composite risk
factor called operator characteristics, much like the safety culture factors in Håvold
(2010a, b). Thus, four primary risk factors resulted: vessel characteristics which are
similar to the ship classifier model inputs in Balmat et al. (2009), route character-
istics, operator characteristics, and passenger loading. Recalling the abstraction
hierarchy and definition of risk, these four primary risk factors are defined less
abstractly than the component parts of risk (i.e., probability and consequence)
(Montewka et al. 2010) and, thus, may be more actionable.
2.1.4 Risk factors defined
Table 2 presents these units in more detail, one may notice that the abstraction
diminishes even more as we begin to further define each risk factor. The abstraction
will all but disappear later when measurements are applied and empirical indicators
are developed.
Some of the units are comprised of attributes, but all of the unit composites are
variable in nature such that they are present in some degree, are real in that some
form of empirical indicator will be available, are sophisticated in that they are able to
be defined, and are member in that the unit of analysis will be the individual vessel
rather than the collective fleet. An enumerative unit is one that possesses a particular
property characteristic regardless of the condition or state of the vessel. An
associative unit is one that has specific property characteristics in a particular vessel
condition. There are also relational units (described by relationship among or
between property characteristics) and statistical units (that summarizes the
distribution of the properties), but these types of units are not present within this
model. The four risk factors are then combined to form the summative unit, defined
as relative risk. By their nature, summative units are global units that stand for an
entire complex compilation of characteristics. According to Dubin (1978), this has
the “characteristic of meaning a great deal, much of which is ill-defined and
unspecified.” Despite this, summative units can serve to characterize a bundle of
properties at one time, but it should primarily be used for educational purposes. In
this study, the educational purpose will be policy development and analysis. The
summative nature of relative risk can be observed in Fig. 3. Each of the four risk
factors combines to produce the summative relative risk. Typically, risk is considered
a multiplicative combination of probability and consequences, but in this case, as
Table 1 Expert consensus list of most informative small passenger vessel risk factors
Casualty history Discrepancy history Passenger loading
Route characteristics Operator experience & quality (crew competency) Vessel characteristics



























































































































































































































































































































































will be seen later, it is an additive combination and this may be partially explained
by the double counting that exists within the overlapping nature of the specific risk
factors. It should be noted that conclusions should not be drawn at this point. Even
though the units are scaled and relational, the entire empirical relationship will need
to be considered such that errors are not introduced. Once the units have been
established, the next step is to identify the interactions among the units.
2.2 Interactions among and between units
In this section, the interaction among and between units will be explored. In an
actual setting, the mathematical relationship between risk factors would be
considered carefully. However, for the sake of demonstrating a proof of concept
for using Dubin's theory-building process in the maritime domain, it has been
arbitrarily assumed that each of the four enumerative or associative risk indicators
combine to form the summative relative risk index as described in Fig. 3. Ultimately,
this assumed relationship would be tested and evaluated in the theory testing steps of
Dubin's process (see Fig. 2).
2.2.1 Mediators, moderators, independent, overlapping, and proxy risk factors
Up until this point, we have implicitly and arbitrarily assumed that there is
independence between each risk factor and the others. While this may have some
intuitive appeal and may make the model more tractable, it is important to examine
the risk factor relationships. By synthesizing across several disciplines, Kraemer et
al. (2001) developed a contemporary framework for classifying risk factor relation-
ships based upon correlation, temporal precedence, and dominance—which relates
closely to Dubin's three forms of interaction (categorical, sequential, and
determinant). Based upon the particular combination of correlation, temporal
precedence, and dominance, risk factors can be determined to be mediators,
moderators, and independent, overlapping, and proxy risk factors. Table 3 shows the
hypothesized relationships between the units.
Based upon the Kraemer taxonomy and the hypothesized relationships, it may be
suggested that passenger loading risk factor and vessel characteristics risk factor are
independent. An argument could be made that passenger loading might be
influenced by hull material due to the limits of various construction materials in






Fig. 3 Risk factors combine
to form summative
relative risk
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facilitate higher passenger loadings. However, since this study focuses on small
passenger vessels, this effect is not considered. In future empirical studies used to
develop an actual risk rating scheme, this should be considered and the boundaries
of the model (see section 2.3) adjusted accordingly. Likewise, the operator
characteristics risk factor would be considered independent of all other risk factors
because the dominance is likely to be misclassified through expert judgment (as
opposed to empirical evaluation). That particular combination of correlation,
temporal precedence, and dominance is theoretically impossible. The route
characteristics risk factor would be considered a proxy for the vessel characteristics
risk factor—likely due to the potential impact of past regulatory interventions.
passenger loading and route characteristics would be considered overlapping—again
likely due to regulatory interventions like the issuance of tiered operating certificates
that allow an inverse relationship between passenger loads and route exposure. This
may indicate that these two risk factors derive from the same underlying construct.
Ultimately, these will need to be thoroughly tested using the empirical data
available before the model could be deployed, but for the purposes of this proof of
concept study, this cursory evaluation will be sufficient.
2.2.2 Human and organizational factors as catalyst
Operator characteristics may be viewed as a catalyst—such that the presence of this
risk factor is necessary in order for two or more risk factors to combine in an adverse
way, but that this combination does not impact the catalyst itself. While this model
has not been developed in such a manner, there is considerable evidence to suggest
that human and organizational factors play a significant role in maritime accidents
(upwards of 80% of accidents are, in part, attributable to operator characteristics)
(see e.g., Gemelos and Ventikos 2008; Bea 2002; Psaraftis et al. 1998). In the
scheme presented above, if the operator characteristics risk factor were found to be
catalytic, it would present as a mediator or moderator. Later, the exact nature of this
relationship will be empirically explored. Figure 4 demonstrates one way (namely as
a moderator) in which operator characteristics could act as a catalyst.
This model suggests that as relative risk increases, the potential and actuality for
casualties increases, where casualty is a new dependent unit. A marine casualty is
generally defined as an accident involving any vessel on the navigable waters of the
Table 3 Hypothesized interactions among risk factors A and B to affect the outcome of lagged accidents
Risk factor A Risk factor B Correlation (+/−−, 0) Temporal precedence Dominancea
Vessel characteristics Route characteristics Slight + No evidence A
Vessel characteristics Passenger loading 0 – No
Vessel characteristics Operator characteristics 0 – B
Route characteristics Passenger loading Slight + – No
Route characteristics Operator characteristics 0 – B
Passenger loading Operator characteristics 0 – B
a Determined through expert paired comparison methods
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USA including accidental groundings, collisions, damage to the vessel like fires or
explosions, and loss of life or serious injury. As the catalyst operator characteristics
improves, it serves to moderate, or diminish the effects (i.e., decrease the slope of the
relationship) of relative risk on casualties.
2.2.3 Policy as catalyst
In the preceding portion of this paper, we have treated the theoretical model strictly
as a descriptive model. In order to make the model a bit more useful, we will now
introduce a new unit—that of policy. This unit is associative, measured as nominal,
and can be identified as a subjective, indirect, descriptive input indicator. Policy
could be described in many different forms—e.g., the introduction of “new”
inspection regimes (as suggested by Degré 2007, Rousos and Ventikos 2008, and
Conachey et al. 2008), providing enhanced response capabilities, or through
additional yet to be defined non-regulatory measures. Figure 5 provides an
illustration of that catalytic moderator relationship. Enhanced policy should reduce
or mitigate the adverse relationship between the various risk factors or relative risk
index and casualties or accident rates.
2.3 Model boundaries
Boundaries are important to the specification of any theoretical model. For the
purposes of this study, the boundaries of the model have been limited to the
regulated US small passenger vessel fleet which can be observed in Fig. 6. This
“closed” system, where there is no exchange between the system and its



















Fig. 5 Potential impact of
policy on risk factors—relation-
ship to accident rates
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There are currently about 6,000 registered small passenger vessels with the
requisite certificates to operate that fall within the boundaries of the model.
Using interior and exterior boundary-determining criteria, it was determined
that the set of units was sufficient. For example, by sub-setting the property
space as in Fig. 6, affirmative criteria can be established to distinguish a unit or
law of interaction from other possible types that would be excluded. While the
units may seem to be generalizable to a larger population, in this model, these
units have been restricted to include only those types within the boundaries. As
the domain covered by this model is constricted, the number of boundary-
determining criteria must increase—there is an inverse relationship between the
two. For example, if we were to narrow the domain of this model from the entire
small passenger vessel industry segment to that of say a specific port, region, class
of vessel or sub-sector (e.g., only ferry vessels), additional boundaries would need
to be defined. It should be noted that the greater the number of boundary-
determining criteria and the smaller the domain covered by the model, the more
the homogeneous the vessels will become within the model. Likewise, as the
domain is “relaxed,” the model will be exposed to greater heterogeneity of
vessels, operators, routes, etc. Additionally, as the model is extended and
generalized, the boundaries must be reexamined to ensure they remain relevant.
This model was empirically tested using data from a particular 18-month period
and if it were to be used now or for a different type of vessel or domain, the model
would require validation and verification. However, this is not the intent of this
paper—instead, this paper is aimed at evaluating a particular model-building
framework.
2.4 System states
A system state is defined by three features:
& Characteristic values for units
& Characteristic values are determinant
& Portfolio of unit values is intransient
Using these three features, we can precisely define a system (i.e., a vessel) state as
a whole by its essential distinctive features (i.e., risk factors). The system state of a
particular vessel will be defined primarily by its summary relative risk rating, that
defined by the risk factors for vessel characteristics, route characteristics, operator
characteristics, and passenger loading. There are many potential possibilities in the
ways in which we might define system state. For simplicity, we will briefly examine





Fig. 6 Model boundaries
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2.4.1 System composed of two states
First, a binary system of “high” and “low” risk system states could be developed by
selecting some arbitrary risk threshold value. This type of system has the advantage
of being easy to implement with only two states, but suffers from a lack of precision
and likely a sensitivity to small changes in risk factors. It would be easy to see how
the “old” vessel on an “open” route with a “sketchy” operator with a “troubled”
history carrying “many” passengers would present a high-risk state and that a “new”
vessel on a “limited” route with a “quality” operator with an “unblemished” history
carrying “few” passengers would present a low-risk state. However, when we move
from the extremes closer to the threshold, it will become increasingly difficult to
distinguish the difference between the system states. For example, suppose we had
one vessel just to the “north” of the threshold and one just to the “south” of that
threshold. Small changes in those risk factors or even the threshold will have a
significant impact upon the system states.
2.4.2 System with intermediate transition state
Alternatively, rather than having a fine threshold line, a broader transition line could
be established. If, in addition to the high- and low-risk states, a transition state was
developed such that it presented a broad zone between high- and low-risk states, this
would alleviate the sensitivity disadvantage of the binary state system above. In the
model with three system states, “transition” in addition to high- and low risk, again-
arbitrary or empirically established thresholds could be devised such that policy
could be applied to the high-risk vessels and a separate policy deployed on the low-
risk vessels such that one would not impact the other. One could imagine equal
zones, a 10%/80%/10% zone breakdown, or something that was based upon a
normal distribution that might be expected to arise as a result of the central limit
theorem.
2.4.3 Frozen and variable states
Frozen states of units are not expected to change with time. The risk factors of route
characteristics and passenger loading are clearly frozen. Additionally, even though
age will obviously increase with time, the vessel characteristics will likely not shift
significantly over time and can be considered frozen as well. On the other hand,
variable or fluid states of units have the potential to change through time. Nagel
(1961) called these types of states “state coordinates” because they determined the
system state. In this model, the risk factor for operator characteristics could be
considered a variable or state coordinate. This would align with the catalyst notion of
human and organizational factors previously discussed.
Alternatively, the composition of risk factors could determine system state. If
vessel state could be categorized just as a function of frozen states alone, the case
could be made that there is no need to identify the critical threshold as it will be
immediately defined. However, it does not seem reasonable that these system states
could be predicated by frozen states alone, but rather as a function of frozen states
and state coordinates. A sensitivity analysis to determine the elasticity of state
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transition based upon each of the risk factors will be conducted later in this paper as
a part of the identification of empirical indicators.
2.4.4 System state defined
Dubin identified three criteria necessary for system states:
& Inclusiveness—all units within the system have a value or a distinctive range of
values in a particular state.
& Determinant—individual units are measurable and distinctive for a particular
state of the system.
& Persistent—each state should have some life span or time.
In its simplest form, the overall state of the vessel system that satisfied the above
criteria might be found in Fig. 7. This is similar to the two-state system described
previously in this section, but without the risk abstraction. It defined two observable
states—normal operations and pre-casualty.
A vessel would primarily reside in the state of normal operations (whatever
that might be and it could potentially include unusual operations). On rare
occasions, the vessel would shift to a pre-casualty (or casualty-eminent) state
that would be the result and/or the presence of the necessary combination of
risk factors. Typically, the undesired pre-casualty state will be short-lived as the
vessel will be driven to return to its preferred equilibrium of normal operations.
If, however, a vessel remains too long in the pre-casualty state, a casualty is
likely to occur. Once a casualty occurs, the vessel would permeate the
boundaries of this model. Such a state model would be useful for identifying
which risk factors may be of use in predicting when this transition is likely to
happen. Upon examination, while additional states could be added (e.g., birth,
death, transition, etc.), these will not be considered in this model. Rather, when
a vessel moves to one of these states, it will permeate the boundaries and will
then be considered a part of another system that will require additional
definition. However, it might be an interesting exercise in forensics to examine
the transition from different states into the death state (whether prematurely or
as expected), but again, that will be left for another time. Also, it would seem
natural to apply Markov chain principles and state diagram techniques to glean
information about transition probabilities from particular states to death, etc.
Now that the model has been well-defined using Dubin's theory-building





Fig. 7 Two-state system
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2.5 Propositions
The most basic, if not trivial, proposition would be one that describes how relative
risk is directly related to the risk factors. For example, if risk factors for vessel
characteristics, route characteristics, operator characteristics, and/or passenger
loading increase, the relative risk increases.
P1a Relative risk is directly related to vessel characteristics
P1b Relative risk is directly related to route characteristics
P1c Relative risk is directly related to operator characteristics
P1d Relative risk is directly related to passenger loading
These could be considered descriptive or even predictive propositions.
Likewise, another set of slightly less trivial propositions include those for when
the risk factors increase, the vessel is more likely to experience a casualty.
P2a Vessel characteristics is directly related to casualty
P2b Route characteristics is directly related to casualty
P2c Operator characteristics is directly related to casualty
P2d Passenger loading characteristics is directly related to casualty
There are many potential versions of these sorts of secondary propositions. In
Fig. 8, we see four distinct, but related categories of propositions.
Along the reverse diagonal of the typology above (i.e., the upper right and lower
left boxes), there is a direct relationship between the independent and dependent
units, they “move” in the same direction. On the diagonal (i.e., upper left and lower
right boxes), there would be an inverse relationship. Given four risk factors and four
potential ways to state this particular proposition, there are 16 different versions of
this one proposition.
A third type of proposition could be a state proposition. For example, if the
system persists in the “risk” state for a prolonged period of time, in addition to
observing an increased number of casualties, system permeability will result and the
vessel will leave the system and consequently enter another state—that is to say,
death. This was discussed briefly in the multi-state system previously.
P3 Prolonged high relative risk is directly related to death.
Like the third proposition, a forth proposition could be put forth. Namely,
equilibrium is established in the “non-risk” state. If the third proposition is not
fulfilled, a vessel will typically pass through the risk state and return to the non-risk
state such that a vast majority of time is observed in the non-risk state. This return to
equilibrium may be a self-correcting mechanism whether or not a casualty occurs.
P4 Moderated relative risk is the equilibrium state to which vessels' return.
Increased Casualties Negative of Proposition 2 Proposition 2 
Decreased Casualties Corollary of Proposition 2 Negative Corollary of 
Proposition 2 
Decreased Risk Factor(s) Increased Risk Factor(s) 
Fig. 8 Typology of basic propositions
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Finally, strategic propositions can be developed such that they define limiting or
critical values for one or more of the units. These critical points could be maxima or
minima, inflection points, or even trigger points where state shifts might occur. If we
were to plot the relative risk or even specific risk factors as the independent variable
and create a cumulative distribution curve, we could potentially classify our
propositions such that they would inform our theory testing.
Figure 9 shows possible examples of the strategic propositions for the cumulative
relative risk curve for a fleet of vessels. Proposition(s) P1 generally describe the
overarching relationship and, thus, is descriptive but not strategic in nature.
Proposition(s) P2 may be used to define the central inflection point. Proposition(s)
P3 may be used to define the range where system permeability may occur, and
proposition(s) P4 may be used to define that secondary inflection point at which
vessels return to a non-risk state rather than being subjected to the state shift and
system departure.
3 Empirical indicators
Now that the theoretical model has been sufficiently established (as described by the
first five steps in Fig. 2), attention can be turned toward testing of the theory (i.e., the
remaining three steps described in Fig. 2). Using the model as a framework,
empirical indicators for each unit must be developed in order for hypotheses to be
formed and ultimately tested. An empirical indicator is the means by which a
researcher measures the value of a particular unit. The next sections describe the
process by which empirical indicators were developed and refined though statistical
evaluation.
3.1 Development of empirical indicators
Returning to the results of the expert elicitation process described in section 2.1.3, in
the process of categorizing the four major risk factors of vessel characteristics, route
characteristics, operator characteristics, and passenger loading, several sub-factors
were identified. While not explicitly a part of the model developed from the risk
factors, these sub-factors were ultimately used in the development of the empirical
indicators. Prior to assigning measurement scales to the sub-factors, the experts were




Fig. 9 Examples of strategic
propositions
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using a modified version of the analytic hierarchy process (Saaty 1982) that had the
experts make paired comparisons of each combination of risk factors (15
comparisons in total) and assign relative weightings between each pair. Results
were compiled using an estimated Eigenvector approach, and the five experts
relative weightings were aggregated using an arithmetic mean (Clemen and Winkler
1999; Seaver 1978). Prior to deploying this model, other forms of aggregations
should also be considered (Shugan and Mitra 2009). Table 4 describes the results of
the paired comparison approach to assigning relative weights to the risk factors.
The comparisons were examined and a consistency ratio was established. The
consistency ratio is a consistency index, which counts the proportion of incoherent
cyclic triads that are identified, divided by a random index, that which might be
expected from a randomized response (Saaty 1980). In this case, the consistency
ratio was 0.07. The threshold for concern is when values of greater than 0.1 are
returned for the consistency ratio. Therefore, it was determined that the responses
were sufficiently consistent. Combining the relative weights for these initial risk
factors into rounded weights for the four risk factors of the model yields the
following: vessel characteristics account for 20% of relative risk, route character-
istics account for 30%, operator characteristics 20%, and passenger loading accounts
for 30% of relative risk. These are indicated in the left column of relative risk index
below.
The experts then developed scales for each of the four major risk factors based
upon the most prominent sub-factors originally identified. Each sub-factor scale was
developed again using a modified analytic hierarchy process. Each risk factor has an
associated empirical scale that is based upon these sub-factors as presented in
Table 5.
3.2 Statistical evaluation of empirical indicators
Next, a statistical analysis was performed upon these empirical indicators. Using the
objective sub-factors scales (which accounted for about 65% of the risk index found in
Table 5. Fig. 10 shows some of the actual work used to develop the proxy scales.), a
proxy scale was developed. The proxy scale becomes a relational–statistical indicator
of the direct measures for the sample population. The test will be homologous with
unit class in order for the homology to be preserved. Using 18 months of data from the
Coast Guard's Marine Safety Management System database, proxy relative risk scores
were assigned to the population of small passenger vessels (i.e., those within the
boundaries of the model). To demonstrate the overall explanatory power of the model,







Table 4 Experts’ aggregate rel-
ative weights for initial risk
factors
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Table 5 Empirical indicator measurement scales for measuring relative risk
Risk factor Measurement scale
Vessel characteristics
(0–20)
• Hull material (0–5)Steel=0, aluminum=1, FRP/plastic=4, wood=5
• Overall condition (0–5)excellent=0, good=2, poor=5




• Exposure (0–5)Dockside=0, rivers=1, lakes, bays, and sounds=2, coastwise/
great lakes=4, oceans=5
• Water temperature (0–5)warm water=0, mixed or seasonal=3, cold water=5
• Congestion and complexity (0–10)Consider traffic volume, density, and mix
along vessel's typical route. Consider visibility, tides, currents, ice,
obstructions, and other relevant hazards to navigation
• Infrastructure (0–10)Consider the ability of the local maritime response
community (including federal, state, and local governments as well as private




• Casualty history (0–5)Examine marine casualty history for past 18 monthsNo
casualties=0, 1 casualty=2, 2 casualties=4, >2 casualties=5
• Inspection/investigation history (0–10)Assign 2 per each priority 1 “no sail”
discrepancy, 1 per every three priority 2 “routine” discrepancies for past
18 months Assign 1 for each fine or penalty in past 18 months
• Organizational safety (0–5)Consider the culture, attitude, and philosophy of an
organization toward safety (e.g., SIP participant may be scored 0, whereas vessel
with history unpreparedness, neglected maintenance may receive up to 5)
Passenger loading
(0–30)
• <50 passenger capacity=0
• 50–150 passenger capacity=10
• 150–600 passenger capacity=20
• >600 passenger capacity=30
Fig. 10 Actual work used in
calculating risk proxy scales
and scores
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the proxy relative risk scores for the 18-month period and the marine casualty
occurrences for the corresponding vessels during a lagged 12-month period were plotted
on a cumulative distribution curve (see Fig. 11). Thus, this figure illustrates the dominant
relationship between relative risk scores and casualties. By selecting a specific relative
risk score, one can determine both the percentage of vessels above that score and the
percentage of casualties attributed to vessels scoring above that score.
Thus, this figure illustrates the relationship between vessels' relative risk scores
and their corresponding casualties. For example, consider the vessels that have proxy
scores above 59 (the portion of the curves to the right of the dashed vertical line),
5% of vessels score above 59, and 33% of marine casualties are from vessels scoring
above 59. Similarly, it may also be noted that 50% of marine casualties are attributed
to 10% of the vessels, i.e., those scoring above 55. This Pareto relationship has the
property of being beneficial for resource allocation decisions, which will be
discussed in more details later.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis of empirical indicators for model
While the previous results would indicate that relative risk is an indicator of marine
casualties, it is important to determine just how sensitive those results would be to shifts
in the arbtrarily assigned weights in the proxy model and also how well the entire model
(described in Table 5) would stand up in practice. The former was examined
empirically by creating a family of alternative models and examining how changes
to risk factor weights and risk factor rating scales would impact the overall results, i.e.,
how often marine casualties could be attributed to the relatively highest-risk vessels. To
accomplish the latter, the relative risk model was packaged in a small passenger vessel
risk rating tool and provided to Coast Guard marine safety offices in two US ports for a
demonstration testing and evaluation on their local small passenger vessel populations.
Fig. 11 Relationship between identified relative risk and marine casualties and marine investigations
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As noted, in addition to testing each risk factor as an empirical indicator
(and it should be noted that collectively, the risk factors are more informative),
a sensitivity analysis was performed on the proxy model by creating a family
of models that were slightly altered from the original. As a cautionary note
about relative empirical indicators, validity does not focus on the converged
empirical indicators, but on the individual units themselves. In this model, the
individual empirical indicators did prove to be homologous with the relative
indicator. The seven model family consisted of the following perturbations of
the original “expert” model:
Model 1. Passenger loading scale inverted based upon marine casualty histories
Model 2. Egalitarian weighting (i.e., 25%) provided to each risk factor
Model 3. Passenger loading weight reduced by 10%
Model 4. Route characteristics weight reduced by 10%
Model 5. Passenger loading weight increased by 10%
Model 6. Route characteristics weight increased by 10%
Model 7. Operator characteristics weight increased by 10%
Whenever a weight was increased or decreased (ie., models 3 through 7), the
decrement was evenly distributed across the remaining risk factors so that the total
relative risk weight=100%. Figure 12 illustrates the relative performance of the
family of models in comparison to the original expert model.
For each model, the figure shows what relative risk score is represented by
the 95th percentile of vessels (horizontal axis), how many marine casualty cases
are captured by vessels scoring above that 95th percentile score (vertical axis),
and also proportion of high-risk vessels the derivative model had in common
with the original expert model (as indicated by the size of the bubble). For
example, if the bubble for a particular model is almost as large as the bubble
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Fig. 12 Sensitivity analysis of family of models
202 P.S. Szwed
were captured by both models; whereas, if the bubble is considerably smaller
than the original expert model (e.g., model 6), then there is a significant
difference in the sample of vessels obtained.
It should also be noted that the lower the relative risk score, the greater the
attribution to marine casualties. This finding illustrates the relative positioning of the
model curves and may be a factor in model selection, but since this study is devoted
to the proof of concept for using Dubin's theory-building framework, the original
expert model will be the focus of the remainder of the paper.
3.4 Beta testing of small passenger vessel risk rating tool
As mentioned previously, the original expert model was formed into a relative risk
rating tool (using the results from Table 5). This small passenger vessel risk rating
tool was then pilot tested at two US ports—Providence, Rhode Island, and Seattle,
Washington.
In the Providence test, 18 small passenger vessels were scored using the
relative risk rating tool. Those vessels already considered to pose an increased
risk scored higher than the others. The port officials indicated that the results
were not surprising and that the highest-scoring vessels were already receiving
elevated concern and attention. They suggested modifications to the tool
including a suggestion that passenger loading could be a multiplier rather than
an additive risk factor. In the Seattle test, 30 vessels (15% of the small
passenger vessel fleet) were evaluated using the relative risk rating tool. They
selected vessels suspected to be from all parts of the spectrum of relative risk
and found that the top and bottom third received scores that were as they
would have expected. It should be noted that these were small stratified
samples (approximately 10% of the population) and were not used as part of
the empirical testing of the model. Instead, this beta testing served as a form of
eliciting face validity and the specific input from this beta-testing was not
incorporated into the eventual model.
At the same time, the small passenger vessel risk rating tool was shared with
various parties within the small passenger industry segment and it was met with a
range of responses from absolute support for the model and its development to an
almost visceral denouncement of the model suggesting that its use would be
tantamount to illegal profiling.
In general, the beta tests confirmed the results that were analytically obtained
using the empirical indicator testing. The unit of relative risk employed in the model
developed in this study as measured by the small passenger vessel relative risk rating
tool results in an effective means of “measuring” the perceived risk posed by specific
small passenger vessels.
4 Discussion
The process for developing theory and models can often be ill-defined or
haphazard. One of the purposes of this article is to demonstrate how Dubin's
theory-building and testing process (described in Fig. 2) can be successfully
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applied to risk modeling in the maritime domain. This research process has several
implications.
First, the moderation-of-process design used this study should prove to be an
effective method and will serve as a complement to the more prominent causal chain
designs already widely used in risk analysis. Additionally, the process used in this
study has been sufficiently illustrated and demonstrated such that practitioners could
apply this process within their domain to further their efforts to develop risk
assessment and management systems. In fact, under the Paris Memorandum of
Understanding and similar Port State control regimes, more general risk-factor
models have been in use for decades. What distinguishes this model is that it is
narrower in its focus; it focuses on a specific fleet and type of vessels within a
particular region. Thus, while there are some significant similarities in the risk
factors (e.g., vessel characteristics and operator characteristics), the model presented
here is unique due to its focus (including the route characteristics and passenger load
risk factors).
Second, the model developed in the study, can be used within the maritime
domain, with a little additional validation and verification, such as evaluation using
Patterson's (1986) eight criteria for theory building. While identifying relative risk
for individual small passenger vessels may be beneficial, it is envisioned that a more
effective use of this model would be analysis at the fleet level. By evaluating
individual small passenger vessel risk and then rolling that up to a set of summary
findings and trends, gaps in the overarching safety regimes could be identified.
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Fig. 13 A risk management framework for the small passenger vessel industry segment
204 P.S. Szwed
Earlier in this article, policy was introduced as a potential catalyst, or moderator, for
improving safety through risk reduction. Figure 13 provides a template to enact a
segment-wide approach to improving safety.
It is broken down into the typical three components of risk management—
characterization, assessment, and management. The model developed in this study
and presented in this article would be used to “quantify” relative risk in the risk
characterization phase. The risk characterization would then be used as screening
devices to identify a subset of the identified highest-risk vessels (which as
demonstrated by this model, are those responsible for disproportionate number of
marine casualties). Using a threshold value for relative risk, specific vessels within
the fleets at each port would be identified for additional scrutiny—risk assessment.
Alternatively, vessels that are relatively low risk may be eligible for reduced scrutiny.
The risk assessment might use something like the ten-step risk analysis process
presented in the Passenger Vessel Association's Risk Guide (Passenger Vessel
Association 2000). The process in the PVA Risk Guide estimates probability and
consequence in order to quantify risk for specific aspects of each vessel's operations.
It also goes on to identify the most cost-effective risk reduction solutions using a
cost-benefit analysis. Immediately, vessel-specific risk reduction and management
may be effected. Additionally, by compiling risk reduction measures, regional and
national risk reduction strategies can be developed as a part of more global risk
management processes.
Third, this risk management framework can be evaluated using existing data
for ports that have currently or previously employed a small passenger risk
rating tool to allocate resources. The data could be broken down into a split-
half time series analysis using a quasi-experimental pre- and post-test design.
This study extension is currently underway and will determine the efficacy of
the risk management framework just described. The principle hypothesis would
be that the relationship between small passenger vessel risk and marine
casualties will be weaker for risk-informed policy regimes than for those that
do not consider risk.
Finally, as discussed in Holton and Lowe (2007), theory-building scholars should
conduct more of this type of research to advance the discipline of risk analysis and to
make theory building more accessible to practitioners by using an intra-disciplinary
approach. Dubin's method provides a coherent process for theory building. Other
methods such as case study (e.g., Dooley 2002; Yin 1994) or grounded theory
building (e.g., Egan 2002; Glaser 1992) are equally well-developed and could
provide additional insight into the study of the discipline of risk analysis and also the
maritime domain. This article represents advancement in that direction, yet, much
work remains.
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Appendix: List of initially identified risk factors (first Delphi round)




















Operating Route Which route is the vessel certificated to operate on (e.g. Oceans, Coastwise, 
LB&S, Rivers)?
Hull Material Steel, Aluminum, FRP, Plywood, Planked, FRP over Wood, etc.
Response 
Infrastructure




Vessel Design or Type Vessel layout (e.g. rails, access to lifesaving equipment, propulsion, or backup 
systems)
Passenger Load Number of passengers (carried or capacity)?
Discrepancy History Some measure of discrepancies resulting from material inspections
Experience 
(Organization)
How long has operator been in business? Has there been a recent change in 
ownership?
Voyage Duration Average time underway per voyage
Owner Quality How well do owners maintain their vessels and do they report problems? 
Hull Condition Time since refastening, gauging reports
Crew Competency 
(Drills)
Judgment of crew competency based on experience from past drills, crew 
training/preparedness





Route Hazards Some indication of traffic or natural hazards (e.g. rocks, narrows, etc.) present 
on vessel’s route
Experience (Crew) How experienced is the crew?
Safety Equipment Does the vessel exceed the required minimum (for lifesaving, firefighting 
equipment, etc.)?
Service Ferry, fishing, dinner, excursion
Proximity to 
Emergency Services
How far to hospitals, ambulance, etc.?
Anticipated 
Environmental Factors
Average weather. Average water temperature, etc.
Extreme 
Environmental Factors




Crew to Passenger 
Ratio
Class of Particular 
Interest
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